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Abstract 
The issue involving the constitutionality of same-sex marriage in Aus-
tralia is about which level of government can legislate on the subject of mar-
riage under the distribution of powers provided by the Constitution. The coun-
try has an express provision in the Constitution granting Federal Parliament 
the power to pass laws on the subject of marriage and other correlating issues. 
Hence, an amendment to the Marriage Act was enacted in 2004 so as to de-
fine marriage as the union between one man and one woman to the exclusion 
of all others. Firstly, this paper analyzes whether the Federal Parliament has 
the authority under the Constitution to legislate on same-sex marriage. Sec-
ondly, the paper discusses whether any Australian state could grant a right 
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I. Introduction 
Section 51 of the Australian Constitution provides the Common-
wealth (i.e., federal) Parliament with the authority to pass legislation 
on the subject of marriage. In 2004, the Commonwealth Parliament 
enacted the Marriage Amendment Act 2004,1 defining marriage as the 
union between one man and one woman to the exclusion of any other 
arrangement. Australia’s express constitutional provisions indicate that 
the Marriage Amendment Act is legally valid, thus precluding any state 
or territory from introducing other same-sex marriage acts. 
The advocates of same-sex marriage have not challenged the fed-
eral amendment to the Marriage Act2 in court. Rather, they have con-
tinued to push for same-sex rights at the state and commonwealth lev-
els. Naturally, any state law legalizing same-sex marriage would 
probably force the matter before the High Court of Australia. Moreo-
ver, if a State introduced same-sex marriage legislation, such legisla-
tion would almost certainly be struck down by the High Court. As a 
matter of fact, as I shall also explain in this paper, perhaps not even the 
Commonwealth Parliament itself is allowed under the provisions of 
the Australian Constitution to introduce legislation that authorizes 
same-sex marriage. 
This article is therefore focused on a legal discussion about the 
constitutionality of legislation that provides for same-sex marriage in 
Australia, so that no conclusion will be drawn on the morality or just-
ness of the issue. This being the case, I propose to explain why the 
Australian Federal Parliament has the power to pass any law dealing 
 
 1. Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth) sch 1 (Austl.). 
 2. Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) (Austl.). 
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with the subject-matter of marriage. Such law would supersede con-
tradictory state or territory law each time the matter of inconsistency 
arises. Under the Marriage Amendment Act 2004, the federal law has 
explicitly defined marriage as the union between a man and a woman 
to the exclusion of any other alternative. The existence of this provi-
sion implies that the Australian states have no power to legislate for 
same-sex marriages. Consequently, if any Australian state or territory 
passes a same-sex-marriage law, such an act must be struck down by 
the High Court as inconsistent with the federal legislation. 
II. The Authority of Federal Parliament to Legislate on 
Marriage 
The Commonwealth Constitution allocates the areas of federal 
legislative power in sections 51 and 52, with these powers being either 
concurrent with the States or exclusive. Furthermore, the federal Par-
liament has express and implied incidental powers to deal with any ar-
eas of law related to its own grants of power. Accordingly, the Com-
monwealth can enact laws with respect to “matters incidental to the 
execution of any power vested by this Constitution in the Parliament,” 
and it can also legislate on any matters which are incidental to the cen-
tral purpose of any of its express heads of power.3 
When a power to legislate on one or more topics is concurrently 
held by both the commonwealth and the states, as it is found with most 
grants of power conferred by section 51 of the Constitution, section 
109 provides a solution to the problem: “the [federal law] shall prevail, 
and the [State] law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.” 
This inconsistency is said to arise whenever a State law cannot be 
obeyed at the same time as a commonwealth law,4 when the federal 
law allows something that a state law prohibits,5 or when a federal law 
 
 3. The distinction between the express incidental power of s 51(xxxix) and the implied 
incidental power was referred to in Gazzo v Comptroller of Stamps (1981) 149 CLR 227, 236 
(Austl.). There, Gibbs CJ explained that the express incidental power concerns matters which are 
incidental to the execution of one of the other substantive heads of constitutional power, while 
the implied incidental power concerns matters which are incidental to the subject matter of a 
substantive head of power. Id. Together they enable the parliament to make any law which is 
directed to the aim or object of a substantive head of power, and any law which is reasonably 
incidental to its complete fulfilment. See Eithne Mills & Mirko Bagaric, Family Law 12 
(2d ed. 2005). 
 4. Mabo v Queensland (1988) 166 CLR 186 (Austl.). 
 5. Colvin v Bradley Bros. Pty. Ltd. (1943) 68 CLR 151, 158 (Austl.). 
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confers a right or immunity that the state law seeks to remove.6 Fur-
thermore, inconsistency may occur when the “cover the field” test is 
applied—meaning that a federal law, either expressly or impliedly, 
evinces the intention of being the only law applicable to the specific 
area of law, i.e., that it intends to “cover the field” on a particular area 
of law. 
The areas listed in sections 51 and 52 of the Australian Constitu-
tion confer the federal Parliament with legislative power over forty 
specific areas, including marriage section 51. Since the Engineers’ case 
in 1920,7 the High Court has traditionally adopted a centralist ap-
proach to the interpretation of federal powers, thus reading the enu-
merated powers of the Commonwealth rather expansively.8 As such, a 
federal law is often upheld by the High Court as being a law with re-
spect to a subject matter of section 51 even if it also concerns matters 
falling within state residuary power.9 
III. Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth): Why it Does 
Not Exceed the Commonwealth Power 
The Constitution provides the Federal Parliament, in section 51, 
with the power to “make laws for the peace, order, and good govern-
ment of the Commonwealth with respect to . . . marriage.” As indicated 
above, the federal law is still binding upon all the States even if a state 
law conflicts with the former, since section 109 determines that “when 
a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the 
latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the incon-
sistency, be invalid.” 
On May 27, 2004, then Prime Minister John Howard introduced 
a bill into Federal Parliament with the explicit intention of preventing 
the recognition of same-sex marriage in Australia. Later in that year, 
the Federal Parliament passed the Marriage Amendment Act 2004 
 
 6. Clyde Eng’g Co. Ltd. v Cowburn (1926) 37 CLR 466, 491 (Austl.). 
 7. Amalgamated Soc’y of Eng’rs v Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd. (1920) 28 CLR 129, 171 
(Austl.). 
 8. Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, ¶12 (“[T]he grants of legislative 
power contained in s 51 [which includes marriage] be construed with all the generality which the 
words used admit and be given their full force and effect.”). 
 9. See Murphyores Inc. Pty. Ltd. v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1, 22 (Austl.); Actors & 
Announcers Equity Ass’n v Fontana Films Pty. Ltd. (1982) 150 CLR 169, 184, 193–94 (Austl.); Com-
monwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 151, 270 (Austl.); Alexandra Private Geriatric Hosp. Pty. 
Ltd. v Commonwealth (1987) 162 CLR 271, 279 (Austl.). 
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(Cth), which had the effect of amending the Marriage Act 1961 in sev-
eral substantial respects.10 In section 5(1), the Amendment inserted a 
text determining that “[marriage] means the union of a man and a 
woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life.” 
At the end of section 88B, the amendment added: “(4) To avoid doubt, 
in this Part (including section 88E) marriage has the meaning given by 
subsection 5(1).” And lastly, after section 88E, the amendment stated: 
“Certain unions are not marriages. A union solemnized in a foreign 
country between: (a) a man and another man; or (b) a woman and an-
other woman; must not be recognized as a marriage in Australia.” 
The definition of marriage has been statutorily defined ever since. 
The statutory definition as provided by federal legislation means that, 
to be lawful in Australia, a marriage has to be solemnized in accordance 
with the provisions of section 5(1) of the Marriage Act, which recog-
nizes the institution of marriage as only “the union of a man and a 
woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life.” 
A paraphrase of the same definition is located in section 46(1) of the 
same act, which then declares the following: 
[B]efore a marriage is solemnized by or in the presence of an author-
ized celebrant, not being a minister of religion of a recognized de-
nomination, the authorized celebrant shall say to the parties, in the 
presence of the witnesses, the words: “I am duly authorized by law to 
solemnize marriages according to law. Before you are joined in mar-
riage in my presence and in the presence of these witnesses, I am to 
remind you of the solemn and binding nature of the relationship into 
which you are now about to enter. Marriage, according to law in Aus-
tralia, is the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all oth-
ers, voluntarily entered into for life. 
The federal “marriage power” derived from the text of the Consti-
tution extends to the regulation of marriage and all other correlated 
matters. To be a law with respect to marriage, it is therefore sufficient 
that the law deals with the circumstances or things that may, either 
directly or indirectly, affect the institution of “marriage” as qualified 
by the federal legislation. Accordingly, once the Commonwealth has 
explicitly defined the meaning of the institution of marriage, any state 
law that conflicts with the definition provided by federal law shall be 
held invalid to the extent of any inconsistency. In other words, any 
attempt by a state parliament to introduce legislation providing for 
 
 10. Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth) sch 1 (Austl.). 
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same-sex marriage will almost certainly be declared constitutionally 
invalid by the High Court on the grounds of conflicting with sections 
5 and 46(1) of the federal Marriage Act. This is obvious insofar as the 
federal law evinces a clear intention to “cover the field” and ban same-
sex marriage. As Katy A. King correctly explains: 
[I]t is clear that Parliament had an intention to cover the field with 
the addition of specific language defining marriage. The Marriage 
Act 1961 was fully functional and operational prior to the Amend-
ment in 2004, which sought only to limit the definition of marriage 
to cover unions between a man and a woman. The existence of the 
amendment itself is a strong indication of Parliament’s intent. The 
provisions added to the Marriage Amendment Act that expressly pro-
hibit recognition of same-sex marriages solemnized in other nations 
is an indication that Parliament intended to prohibit any same-sex 
marriage solemnized in Australia as well. The Commonwealth’s leg-
islative intention to cover the field gives strong indication that the 
High Court will determine that section 109 applies; any state laws 
that attempt to define marriage as other than between a man and a 
woman will be invalidated.11 
Since the Australian Constitution allows the Federal Parliament to 
enact legislation to both regulate and protect marriage, it would be 
imprudent for supporters of same-sex marriage to force a judicial de-
termination on the constitutional validity of the Marriage Amendment 
Act. After all, it seems evident that the amendments are constitution-
ally valid and that any judicial challenge to the Act could lead to the 
further clarification of the plenary power of Federal Parliament to ex-
ercise its express authority to regulate on marriage and family. As a 
matter of fact, such challenge could potentially result in the Australian 
states being further precluded from creating laws which provide same-
sex couples with legal benefits that are either equal or similar to those 
granted to heterosexual couples.12 Indeed, as King points out: 
[A] ruling upholding the legality of the Marriage Amendment Act 
 
 11. Katy A. King, The Marriage Amendment Act: Can Australia Prohibit Same-Sex Mar-
riage?, 16 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 137, 162 (2007). 
 12. Naturally, same-sex marriage is not the only way same-sex couples may obtain equal 
rights vis-à-vis married heterosexual couples. There are other and perhaps more viable options 
than “marriage” for legal recognition under state and federal laws of same-sex relations. As a 
matter of fact, the law in Australia already provides equal benefits for both same-sex and hetero-
sexual couples in a great variety of different ways. Indeed, both federal and state laws currently 
provide same-sex couples a status which is basically the same as that provided for married couples 
under nearly all aspects of the law, including property transfers and superannuation. 
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from the High Court would not only eliminate same-sex marriage at 
the commonwealth level, but also eliminate same-sex marriage at the 
state level. Section 109 of the Australian Constitution likely prevents 
individual states and territories from legalizing same-sex marriage, as 
commonwealth legislation supersedes any conflicting state legisla-
tion. A ruling upholding the commonwealth’s exclusive jurisdiction 
on marriage could lead to legislation that even further curtails equal-
ity of same-sex couples.13 
Unlike the United States Constitution, the Australian Constitu-
tion does not contain an equal rights provision such that same sex mar-
riage advocates could use to argue the Marriage Amendment Act is not 
constitutionally valid. This Constitution is entirely devoid of a bill of 
rights because its framers believed that a federal constitution, which 
brings about a division of power in actual practice, would be a more 
secure protection for basic political freedoms than a bill of rights.14 
Since we are dealing with a federal document of considerably limited 
powers, the Commonwealth Parliament has only the powers explicitly 
granted by the Constitution, and no more. One such power is the 
power of Commonwealth Parliament to makes laws with respect to 
marriage and divorce. 
In this sense, there is nothing in the text of the Australian Consti-
tution that would prevent the Federal Parliament from passing legis-
lation prohibiting same-sex marriage. Because of the framer’s percep-
tion that a bill of rights could be used as a pretext for the expansion of 
federal powers, including the federal judicial powers, Sir Anthony Ma-
son, then Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, explained that 
“[t]he prevailing sentiment of the framers that there was no need to 
incorporate a comprehensive Bill of Rights in order to protect the 
rights and freedoms of citizens . . . was one of the unexpressed assump-
tions on which the Constitution was drafted.”15Under the system of 
government established in the country, one proceeds on the assump-
tion of full individual rights and liberty, and then turns to the positive 
law just to see whether there are any exceptions to the general rule. 
After comparing this constitutional model with the American one, the 
late Australian constitutional lawyer W. Anstey Wynes commented: 
 
 13. King, supra note 11, at 140. 
 14. Harry Gibbs, A Constitutional Bill of Rights, in Ken. Baker, An Australian Bill of 
Rights: Pro and Contra, 325 (1986). 
 15. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 136. 
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The performance of the Supreme Court of the United States has be-
come embroiled in discussions of what are really and in truth political 
questions, from the necessity of assigning some meaning to the vari-
ous “Bill of Rights” provisions. The Australian Constitution . . . dif-
fers from its American counterpart in a more fundamental respect in 
that, as the. . . Chief Justice of Australia [Sir Owen Dixon] has 
pointed out, Australia is a “common law” country in which the State 
is conceived as deriving from the law and not the law from the State.16 
Naturally, since the Federal Parliament has the authority to define 
marriage so as to exclude same-sex marriage, arguably this power could 
also be extended to further protect its own definition of the institution. 
This would be done through, among other things, new legislation 
which would prohibit the states from enacting same-sex legislation that 
mimics heterosexual marriage. State laws which then provided alter-
native arrangements for the federal regulation and definition of mar-
riage would be invalid on the grounds of inconsistency with the federal 
law. 
To achieve their goal, the advocates of “marriage equality” should 
not attempt to get the states to introduce same-sex marriage legisla-
tion. Rather, the best approach is to convince the federal government 
to further amend the federal Marriage Act 1961 so that at this time 
same-sex marriage can be legalized at federal level. Curiously, this 
would by no means represent a guarantee of ultimate victory for such 
advocates, since the method of interpretation traditionally adopted by 
the courts in Australia may actually require an amendment to the Con-
stitution for the legalization of same-sex marriage. 
IV. Why the Commonwealth May Not Have the Power to 
Legalize Same-Sex Marriage 
On September 19, 2012, the House of Representatives over-
whelmingly voted against federal legislation that would have legalized 
same-sex marriage in Australia. Just forty-two members of Parliament 
(MPs) supported the private member’s bill put forward by Labor back-
bencher Stephen Jones, while ninety-eight MPs voted against. MPs 
from the Labor minority government were given a conscience vote on 
the legislation, whereas Coalition (Liberals/Nationals) MPs were ex-
pected to follow the party’s position on the issue—not supporting any 
 
 16. William Anstey Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Aus-
tralia vii (1955). 
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change to marriage laws. As a result, all Coalition MPs and a significant 
number of Labor MPs, including Prime Minister Julia Gillard, voted 
against the bill.17 On the following day it was the time for the Senate 
to vote on a separate bill, co-sponsored by four Labor Senators.18 The 
Senate joined the House of Representatives by also voting down this 
proposed legislation, the final vote being twenty-six in favour and 
forty-one against.19 
The debate about same-sex marriage has prompted an auxiliary 
discussion regarding whether the Federal Parliament has authority un-
der the constitution to legalize same-sex marriage. Of course, it is un-
deniably within the limits of this Parliament to pass legislation that 
provides for the definition of marriage in its traditional terms.20 And 
yet, it is not entirely clear if the Federal Parliament could legislate oth-
erwise, since the word “marriage” may actually need to be interpreted 
in the same way as it was interpreted when the Australian Constitution 
was enacted. Indeed, the High Court of Australia has repeatedly con-
firmed its own traditional understanding that the meaning of a given 
word should remain fixed as it was established at the time the legal text 
was enacted. According to the “orthodox rules” of Australian legal in-
terpretation that are both established and traditionally adopted by the 
High Court, “the essential meaning which constitutional terms had as 
at the date when the constitution was enacted in 1900 . . .”21 According 
to Professor Jeremy Kirk: 
 
 17. Curiously, ten of the seventeen Cabinet Ministers in the lower house, plus Greens MP 
Adam Bandt, and three independent MPs, (Andrew Wilkie, Rob Oakeshott and Craig Thomson) 
voted for the legislation. See Lower House Votes Down Same-Sex Marriage Bill ABC News (Sept. 
19, 2012), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-09-19/same-sex-marriage-bill-voted-
down/4270016; see also Gay Marriage Bill Defeated, The Age (Sept. 19, 2012), 
http://www.theage.com.au/national/gay-marriage/bill-defeated-20120919-266a8.html. 
 18. Labor Senators: Trish Crossin, Carol Brown, Gavin Marshall and Louise Pratt. 
 19. The Senate is also considering another bill to legalize same-sex marriage. Sponsored 
by Greens Senator Sarah Hanson-Young, this bill will be left on the table until there is enough 
support in Parliament to see it passed. Simon Cullen, Australian Senate Votes Down Same-Sex 
Marriage Bill, ABC News (Sept. 21, 2012), www.abc.net.au/news/2012-09-20/an-senate-votes-
down-second-bill/4272428; see also Gay Marriage Bill Defeated in Senate, The Australian (Sep-
tember 20, 2012), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/breaking-news/lib-senator-breaks-
ranks-for-gay-marriage/story-fn3dxiwe-1226477960806. 
 20. The traditional definition of marriage is that given by Lord Penzance in Hyde v Hyde 
as “the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others.” Hyde 
v Hyde (1866) FAM LR 1 P & D 130, 133 (Aust.). 
 21. Geoffrey Lindell, Constitutional Issues Regarding Same-Sex Marriage: A Comparative 
Survey—North America and Australasia, 30 Sydney L. Rev. 27, 38 (2008); King v Jones (1972) 128 
CLR 221,229 (Austl.); Bonser v La Macchia (1969) 122 CLR 177 (Austl.); Attorney-Gen.(Vic) ex rel. 
Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559, 578 (Austl.). 
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 The Australian literalist orthodoxy falls within the realm of 
originalism . . . [which] indicates that constitutional words are to be 
given their full, natural or literal meaning as understood in their tex-
tual and historical context . . . Provisions are to be understood ac-
cording to their essential meaning at the time they were enacted in 
1900.22 
This is obviously a question that involves principles of constitu-
tional interpretation and how the courts should interpret the meaning 
of a constitutional term or provision. Of course, the interpretation of 
a law varies from individual judge to individual judge, according to his 
or her own jurisprudential approach. In other words, how a judge de-
cides a case depends greatly on the way in which he or she interprets 
the law that must be applied to the case. While there are several com-
peting theories regarding legal interpretation, the search for legislative 
purpose is generally said to be the only one that provides the historical 
evidence of what was, in actual fact, the real intention of the legislator. 
This being so, in the Cross-Vesting Case Justice McHugh commented 
that “[t]he starting point for a principled interpretation of the Consti-
tution is the search for the intention of the makers.”23 Such “inten-
tionalism” is commonly called originalism, and it may be described as 
a method of interpretation which aims at discovering the original 
meaning of the legal text. It does so by critically observing and analyz-
ing the “intention” to be gathered from the law. Originalism thus rests 
on the general assumption that the intention of the legislator is a fun-
damental tool to legal interpretation. Such method looks to the histor-
ical evidence of what was, in actual fact, the intention of the legislator 
and not merely to the letter of the law. 
In Australia, traditional principles of legal interpretation rest on a 
literal-originalist approach that concentrates on the essential meaning 
that the term possessed as of the date the law was enacted.24 As a matter 
of fact, in their standard commentary on the Australian Constitution, 
John Quick (one of the drafters of the Constitution) and Robert Gar-
ran (who played a significant role in the Australian federation move-
ment) comment that the intention of the framers was to prevent the 
Federal Parliament from expanding its limited and specified powers at 
 
 22. Jeremy Kirk, Constitutional Interpretation and a Theory of Evolutionary Originalism, 27 
Fed. L. Rev. 323, 324–25 (1999). 
 23. Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (Cross-Vesting Case) (1999) 198 CLR 511, 551 (Austl.). 
 24. See Lindell supra note 21. 
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its own convenience by simply changing the meaning of the words of 
the Constitution. As stated by them: 
 Every power alleged to be vested in the National government, or 
any organ thereof, must be affirmatively shown to have been granted. 
There is no presumption in favour of the existence of a power; on the 
contrary; the burden of proof lies on those who assert its existence, 
to point out something in the Constitution which, either expressly or 
by necessary implication, confers it. Just as an agent, claiming to act 
on behalf of his principal, must make out by positive evidence that 
his principal gave him the authority he relies on; so Congress, or 
those who rely on one of its statues, are bound to show that the peo-
ple have authorized the legislature to pass the statute. The search for 
the power will be conducted in a spirit of strict exactitude, and if there 
be found in the Constitution nothing which directly or impliedly 
conveys it, then whatever the executive or legislature of the National 
government, or both of them together, may have done in persuasion 
of its existence, must be deemed null and void, like the act of any 
other unauthorized agent.25 
Also in their standard commentary, Quick and Garran provide the 
original meaning of the term “marriage” as properly understood by the 
framers of the Australian Constitution: 
 Marriage is a relationship originating in contract, but is some-
thing more than a contract. It is what is technically called a status, 
involving a complex bundle of rights, privileges, obligations, and re-
sponsibilities which are determined and annexed to it by law inde-
pendent of contract. According to the law of England a marriage is a 
union between a man and a woman on the same basis as that on which 
the institution is recognized throughout Christendom, and its es-
sence is that it is (1) a voluntary union, (2) for life, (3) of one man and 
one woman, (4) to the exclusion of all others.26 
The search for original meaning is commonly recognized in Aus-
tralia as the starting point for matters of legal interpretation.27 Strict 
originalism, as Professor Jeffrey Goldsworthy indicates, is motivated 
“by a proper respect for people in the present—namely, the electors of 
Australia and their elected representatives, who, pursuant to [section] 
128 of the [Australian] Constitution, have exclusive authority to change 
 
 25. John Quick & Robert Randolph Garran, The Annotated Constitution of 
the Australian Commonwealth 795 (1901). 
 26. Id. at 608. 
 27. See King, supra note 11, at 154. 
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their own Constitution.”28 
Accordingly, originalism may be applied to determine whether the 
federal Parliament would have the power to legislate on same-sex mar-
riage. In 1901, the word “marriage” meant the “voluntary union for 
life between one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.”29 
If such interpretation were to be accepted today, this would effectively 
deny the Federal Parliament the power to legislate for same-sex mar-
riages, since such determination would be regarded as going outside of 
the scope of the term’s original meaning.30 Indeed, as Professor Geof-
frey Lindell points out: 
At the time of federation the meaning of the term ‘marriage’ most 
commonly acknowledged was that contained in the cases which re-
fused to recognise foreign polygamous marriage because such unions 
did not satisfy the traditional meaning of marriage now explicitly em-
bodied in the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth). Not surprisingly this will 
make it difficult for the Court to accept that same-sex marriages now 
come within the meaning of the term “marriage” in [section] 51(xxi) 
of the Commonwealth Constitution—a view that has already at-
tracted some judicial support.31 
Under the traditional principles of Australian legal interpretation, 
the meaning of a word is limited to what the word meant at the time 
the legal text was enacted. Thus, not even the Federal Parliament 
would have the authority under the Constitution to redefine the insti-
tution of marriage, but rather only the power to reinforce such a mean-
ing—namely, the one that does not encompass same-sex relations. 
Therefore, as Professor Lindell also explains, it is very likely that the 
term “marriage” was already confined to unions between persons of 
the opposite sex, with such a term being consequently defined as a “un-
ion of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others” even before 
it was amended in 2004.32 “The amending legislation was designed to 
put this beyond any doubt.”33 
 
 28. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Constitutional Law: Interpreting the Constitution in Its Second Cen-
tury, 24 Melb. U. L. Rev. 677, 683 (2000). 
 29. Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (Cross-Vesting Case) (1999) 198 CLR 511, 553 (Austl.). 
 30. King, supra note 11, at 154. See also Dan Meagher, The Times Are They a-Changing?: 
Can the Commonwealth Parliament Legislate for Same Sex Marriages?, 17 Austl. J. Fam. L. 1, 3 
(2003) (“If that level of abstraction were now accepted, it would deny the Parliament of the Com-
monwealth the power to legislate for same sex marriages . . . .”). 
 31. Lindell, supra note 21, at 39 (footnote omitted). 
 32. See id. (discussing the origin of the proposed definition). 
 33. Id. at 42. 
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As can be noted, one significant issue derived from the conse-
quences of “originalism” is whether it is constitutionally valid for the 
Federal Parliament to legalize same-sex marriage.34 Again, in 1900, 
“the word ‘marriage’ meant a union of a man and a woman—and this 
would almost certainly have been regarded as an essential part of the 
connotation, and not merely the denotation, of the word.”35 Such in-
terpretation would exclude the Federal Parliament from legislating for 
same-sex marriages. 
The issue seems rather simple, but it is actually far more compli-
cated that one might expect; for Goldsworthy also reminds us that it is 
actually “possible to make a respectable argument consistent with 
originalism that leads to the opposite conclusion.”36 An originalist ap-
proach may embrace a non-literalist approach that, as such, could re-
gard any future developments as being “unanticipated by the found-
ers.”37 In this sense, the example of the American Constitution may be 
provided. Goldsworthy reminds us that the American Constitution 
gives Congress the power to raise “Armies” and a “Navy.”38 Of course, 
the Air Force is not mentioned because such a branch of the military 
forces was unknown at the time the Constitution was drafted.39 How-
ever, since the underlying purpose was to give Congress the exclusive 
power to raise and regulate all the nation’s military forces, the Con-
gress has been allowed to legislate on the Air Force.40 
According to Goldsworthy, an analogous originalist argument 
could be mounted to conclude that the Australian Federal Parliament 
can legislate for same-sex marriages.41 The term “marriage” would 
 
 34. Goldsworthy, supra note 28, at 699. 
 35. King, supra note 11, at 150 n.106 (quoting Goldsworthy, supra note 28, at 699). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Goldsworthy, supra note 28, at 699. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 699–701. The same point is made by Lindell: 
  But even the orthodox approach is tempered by two major considerations. The 
first is that even that approach concentrates on the essential rather than non-essential 
meaning of terms. Secondly, it has long been acknowledged that there is a need to 
interpret constitutional powers broadly, given the difficulty of amending the Consti-
tution and the need to ensure that it adapts to the new developments not foreseen by 
the framers. To take a hypothetical example, if the Commonwealth Parliament had 
been given the power to legislate with respect to ‘transportation’, new forms of trans-
portation not contemplated at the time the power was first conferred, whether in the 
Constitution as originally enacted or as subsequently amended, would still be treated 
as coming within that power. Actual examples can be drawn from the power to make 
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therefore be interpreted as being wide enough to encompass same-sex 
marriage, a proposition that Goldsworthy notes has already been con-
templated by some Australian judges and scholars, “some of whom 
subscribe to the orthodox principles of constitutional interpreta-
tion.”42 It would be argued in such a case that some words of the Con-
stitution “fail to give effect to their intended purpose,” so that such 
words could “be expanded or contracted in a simple and obvious way 
in order to remedy the failure.”43 As a result, a court could eventually 
be justified in expanding the meaning of a legal term so as to encom-
pass analogous or unpredictable situations that were not envisaged by 
the drafters of the legislation. 
As Moens and Trone similarly point out, “[o]ne question which 
has not been clarified is whether the Commonwealth Parliament may 
legislate in a manner which departs substantially from th[e] traditional 
definition [of marriage].”44 Former High Court judges have, in obiter 
dicta, expressed their personal opinions on the matter. Justice Bren-
nan, for example, once argued that it is “beyond the powers of the 
Commonwealth Parliament to legislate for any other form of marriage 
besides that encompassed by its traditional definition.”45 Conversely, 
Justice McHugh has adopted a much broader approach to the meaning 
of marriage: 
Thus, in 1901 “marriage” was seen as meaning a voluntary union for 
life between one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others. 
If that level of abstraction were now accepted, it would deny the Par-
liament of the Commonwealth the power to legislate for same sex 
marriages, although arguably “marriage” now means, or in the near 
future may mean, a voluntary union for life between two people to the 
exclusion of others.46 
 
laws with respect to ‘postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other like services’ in [section] 
51 (v) in relation to radio and television broadcasting and now almost certainly the 
internet as well. 
  What is different about the changes that may have occurred in relation to same-
sex marriages is that those changes relate to cultural and social values in contrast to 
changes which involved scientific developments and inventions. 
Lindell, supra note 21, at 38–39 (citation omitted). 
 42. Lindell, supra note 21 at 40. See also Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (Cross-Vesting Case) 
(1999) 198 CLR 511, 553 (Austl.); Singh v Commonwealth (2004) 222 CLR 322, 343–344. 
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According to Alastair Nicholson, a former family court judge, it is 
not entirely clear “whether, for the purposes of the Constitution, mar-
riage should be given the meaning it had in 1901, when the Constitution 
came into effect, or in 1961, when the Marriage Act was passed, or 
whether it should have its contemporary, everyday meaning.”47 For 
example, Michael Kirby, a former High Court Justice and an advocate 
of same-sex marriage, supports a “contemporary” approach to the 
Constitution which would set the document “completely free . . . from 
the intentions, beliefs and wishes of those who drafted it so that it is 
viewed by each succeeding generation of Australians with the eyes of 
their own times[.]”48 Kirby advocates an “extreme and radical version 
of non-originalism, which concedes almost no relevance at all to either 
the Constitution’s original meaning or its founders’ intentions.”49 Of 
course, his “living constitution” approach would allow the judicial elite 
to update the law in light of the “contemporary needs of society” as 
perceived by the courts. 
Ironically, however, applied to its logical extreme, Kirby’s revi-
sionist approach implies that the Federal Parliament has the power not 
just to create same-sex marriage but also to ban or prohibit it.50 This 
would almost certainly be the case, because most grants of federal 
power enumerated in section 51, including the marriage power, are 
traditionally interpreted by the High Court as comprising “a plenary 
power, to be ‘construed with all the generality which the words used 
admit.’”51 Indeed, the High Court has indicated that the words of the 
Constitution should be interpreted generously in the Common-
wealth’s favor, meaning that this court would be likely to allow the 
Federal Parliament considerable discretion in defining the institution 
 
of the Family Court of Australia has supported an evolution in the definition of marriage in the 
context of today’s society: 
[W]e think it plain that the social and legal institution of marriage as it pertains to 
Australia has undergone transformations that are referable to the environment and 
period in which the particular changes occurred. The concept of marriage therefore 
cannot, in our view, be correctly said to be one that is or ever was frozen in time. 
 Attorney-Gen. (Cth) v Kevin [2003] FamCA 94, ¶ 87. 
 47. Alastair Nicholson, The Legal Regulation of Marriage, 29 Melb. U. L. Rev. 556, 563 
(2005). 
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ship?, 24 Melb. U. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2000). 
 49. Goldsworthy, supra note 28, at 679. 
 50. King, supra note 11, at 156. 
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of marriage. 
The ultimate question, however, relates on whether there might 
be “a sufficient connection between the law and the subject matter to 
be able to say that the law is one with respect to that subject matter.”52 
As mentioned earlier, section 51 gives plenary power to the Common-
wealth to make laws with respect to marriage. Each of the heads of 
power in section 51 “can support not only laws which operate directly 
on the subject matter of the paragraph in question but also laws which 
do not operate directly but which can be seen as incidental to the 
power.”53 Hence, it appears that the High Court would almost cer-
tainly construe the federal marriage power broadly and generally 
enough so as to provide the Federal Parliament with the power to le-
galize same-sex marriage. 
In any case, the constitutional question is still unsettled and the 
opponents of same-sex marriage may embrace a literal-originalist ap-
proach that opposes any attempt towards the legalization of same-sex 
marriage. Given the ongoing push by the homosexual lobby for same-
sex marriage, supporters of traditional marriage may opt for taking the 
definition of marriage out of the hands of Parliament and placing it 
directly in the hands of the people. 
When considering the need for a referendum on the extent of sec-
tion 51(xxi), it may be argued that “[t]he founding fathers recognised 
[sic] that the specified powers set out in the Constitution should not 
be immutable forever, but provided a mechanism in section 128 to en-
sure that any change to the powers set out in the Constitution should 
be subject to the will of the people and not the mere convenience of 
the Parliament from time to time.”54 Arguing from this position, Ne-
ville Rochow has contended that any change in the institution of mar-
riage should be considered by the Australian people by way of popular 
referendum, as provided in section 128 of the Constitution. According 
to him, legal uncertainty can only be bypassed by a referendum, and “a 
referendum is the only respectful way in which to treat the people by 
taking the matter to them.”55 
A further alternative for the advocates of traditional marriage 
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would be to ask Parliament to further amend the Marriage Act along 
the lines of the Flag Act 1953, which requires any change to the Aus-
tralian National Flag to be approved by “a majority of all electors vot-
ing.”56 According to James Bowen, a Victorian lawyer and former 
Crown Prosecutor, “[s]uch a referendum would be likely to ensure that 
the issue of significant change to a fundamental Australian institution 
was widely debated in the context of a federal election and not in a 
back-door manner of a vote on an amendment initiated by private 
Member’s bills.”57 
V. Attempts by the Australian States to Legislate 
Same-Sex Marriage 
The recent defeat of same-sex marriage legislation in Federal Par-
liament made its supporters shift their focus to legalizing it at the state 
level. Around Australia, a number of states and the Australian Capital 
Territory have considered bills to legalize state same-sex marriage. In 
Western Australia, for example, the Greens have announced their plan 
to introduce a same-sex marriage bill in the state parliament.58 Such a 
bill will have little prospect of being passed, because the ruling (Lib-
eral-Nationals) coalition does not support the proposal.59 
In New South Wales, a same-sex bill has been prepared by a 
“cross-party working group” made up of Nationals MP Trevor Khan, 
Liberal MP Bruce Notley-Smith, the Greens Cate Faehrmann, Labor 
Penny Sharpe, and Sydney independent Clover Moore. It has been re-
cently announced that all political party leaders—Liberal Premier 
Barry O’Farrell, Nationals Leader Andrew Stoner, and Labor Oppo-
sition Leader John Robertson—would allow their members to have a 
conscience vote on the proposed legislation.60 
In Victoria, a same-sex marriage bill has been moved by the Greens 
 
 56. Flags Act 1953 s 3(2)b. (Austl.). 
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MLC Sue Pennicuik into the State Legislative Council, which is simi-
lar to those recently introduced in Tasmania and South Australia.61 
However, Liberal Premier Ted Baillieu is not planning to allow a con-
science vote.62 Premier Baillieu reportedly opposes same-sex marriage, 
and the ruling Liberal-Nationals coalition “regard[s] marriage as a 
matter for the Commonwealth.”63 
In Tasmania, there has been a much greater chance for a same-sex 
marriage bill to be passed. A recent bill, which was co-sponsored by 
Labor Premier Lara Giddings64 and Greens leader Nick McKim, 
passed the Lower House (with all Labor members and all the Greens 
members voting for it) but it was defeated in the Upper House,65 
where the President of Chamber, independent member Sue Smith, ex-
pressed her opposition to same-sex marriage.66 
Finally, in South Australia Upper House Greens member Tammy 
Franks has recently moved a same-sex marriage bill, which is co-spon-
sored by Labor MP Ian Hunter and Labor Premier Jay Weatherill. 
The Parliament is likely to debate the matter in early 2013, and Prem-
ier Weatherill has indicated that all Labor MPs will be allowed a con-
science vote on the issue.67 
The problem with these attempts to push for State-based same-sex 
marriage is that any such attempts would probably be subject to disal-
lowance by the High Court were a challenge to be mounted. Section 
51(xxi) of the Constitution explicitly provides the Commonwealth with 
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the authority to make laws with respect to marriage. According to 
Goldsworthy, “[t]he purpose of granting power to the Commonwealth 
Parliament to legislate with respect to marriage was to make possible 
uniform national regulation of a vitally important legal relationship 
that underpins family life, child rearing, and therefore social welfare 
throughout the nation.”68 Indeed, Quick and Garran explain that par-
agraphs xxi and xxii in section 51 were conceived by the Australian 
drafters out of a “sense of the desirability of uniform laws of marriage 
and divorce.”69 For them, the main goal of such provisions was to en-
able the Commonwealth to abolish any conflicting state laws, and so 
establish “uniformity of legislation on subjects of such vital and na-
tional importance as marriage and divorce.”70 The purpose was there-
fore to provide Federal Parliament with the authority to create a legal 
code with respect to marriage (and divorce), as explained by Justice Ja-
cobs in Russell v. Russell: 
The reason for their inclusion appears to me to be twofold. First, 
although marriage and the dissolution thereof are in many ways a 
personal matter of the parties, social history tells us that the state has 
always regarded them as matters of public concern. Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, the need was recognized for a uniformity 
in legislation on these subject matters throughout the Common-
wealth. . . . Differences between the States in the laws governing the 
status and the relationship of married persons could be socially divi-
sive to the harm of the new community which was being created.71 
In Russell the court held that the marriage power of section 51 is 
not restricted by implications flowing from section 51, which deals 
with matters of divorce and marital causes.72 In addition to matters of 
marriage, divorce, and parental rights, the Federal Parliament has in-
cidental powers to protect and regulate marriage. There are two types 
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of incidental powers related to the heads of powers enumerated in sec-
tion 51: “express incidental power” and “implied incidental power.” 
The distinction between express incidental power and the implied in-
cidental power was referred to by Chief Justice Gibbs in Gazzo v Comp-
troller of Stamps (Vic) (1981).73 There he explained that while the ex-
press incidental power concerns matters that are incidental to the 
execution of any of the other substantive heads of power, the implied 
incidental power concerns matters which are incidental to the subject-
matter of a substantive head of power.74 Together they enable the Fed-
eral Parliament to make any law which is directed to the aim or object 
of a substantive head of power, as well as any law which is reasonably 
incidental to its fulfilment.75 Hence, in Attorney-General for Victoria v 
Commonwealth, the High Court upheld the validity of provisions pro-
hibiting bigamy as a matter intrinsically related to the validity of mar-
riage.76 
As referred to above, the Federal Parliament has amended the 
Marriage Act 1961 in several substantial respects. An amendment was 
inserted into section 5(1), determining that marriage, to be lawful in 
Australia, has to be solemnized in accordance with section 5(1). When 
the Marriage Act was amended, the intention was to provide a stand-
ardized definition of marriage for the whole nation. Section 109 of the 
Constitution resolves any conflict between federal and state laws in fa-
vor of the former, thus confirming the supremacy of the Common-
wealth to regulate all matters related to marriage, children of the mar-
riage, welfare of those children, matrimonial property, etc. 
Importantly, section 6 of the Marriage Act preserves the validity of 
state and territory laws relating only to the registration of marriage, 
which obviously signals the intention of the federal legislator to cover 
the field of all aspects of marriage besides mere registration.77 In addi-
tion, the new section, 88EA, of the Marriage Act states that same-sex 
marriages conducted overseas are not recognized as marriages “in Aus-
tralia.”78 It is significant that the law uses the word “Australia” rather 
than the phrase “under the Commonwealth law,” which is therefore 
another clear indication that the Commonwealth intended for its law 
 
 73. Gazzo v Comptroller of Stamps (Vic) (1981) 7 CLR 675, 680 (Austl.). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Mills & Bagaric, supra note 3, at 12. 
 76. Attorney-General (Vic) v Commonwealth (1962) 107 CLR 529 (Austl.). 
 77. Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 6 (Austl.). 
 78. Id. s 88EA. 
 465]  The Constitutionality of Same-Sex Marriage in Australia 
485 
to cover the field, to be the sole law on the topic in Australia.79 Given 
that Section 88EA explicitly declares that the field is to be confined to 
the Commonwealth definition of marriage, it is wrong to suppose that 
the field is confined only to heterosexual marriage, because the legis-
lator clearly wanted to make sure that marriage for federal purposes 
means the union between a man and a woman.80 
On the other hand, it could be said that no inconsistency arises if 
both federal and state laws were capable of coexisting and the former 
did not enable people to be married under both laws. Arguing from 
this position, Professor George Williams has suggested that the field 
of federal law is not “marriage” in general, but rather “different-sex 
marriage.”81 According to him, the explicit reference in the Common-
wealth act of the institution of marriage as meaning the union between 
a man and a woman was designed to head off arguments that the Act 
allowed for same-sex marriage.82 Those amendments in 2004 to the 
Marriage Act would have the effect of reducing the field of federal law, 
hence leaving the field of “same sex marriage” open for the States. Ac-
cording to Williams, the ederal act now seeks to prevent only the 
recognition of same-sex marriage conducted overseas, and it would say 
nothing about the recognition of same-sex marriage conducted in Aus-
tralia, which would indicate that the field was simply vacated for the 
States.83 “The consequence,” he concludes, “is that, while the federal 
and state acts both refer to what they call ‘marriage,’ they are two laws 
that operate in different fields.”84 
Williams’s argument is unconvincing for a couple of reasons. First 
of all, he claims that the Tasmanian bill does not conflict with the fed-
eral Marriage Act because section 40 of the state bill renders a same-
sex marriage void if either party contracts a marriage under the federal 
Marriage Act; i.e., with a person of the opposite sex.85 But surely, the 
interpretation of the intended scope and meaning of the federal legis-
lation cannot turn on the contingencies of what a state legislation 
might happen to say. Thus, what if a state law authorized same-sex 
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marriage but it did not contain a non-bigamy clause? Would that imply 
that people could be married under the federal law and subsequently 
married under the state law? Such a result would be contrary to the 
intent of sections 23B and 94 of the Commonwealth act, which is in-
tended to prevent bigamy of all kinds regardless of how marriage is 
defined. 
Of course, the matter can only arise on the assumption that the 
Commonwealth act is limited to the field of traditional marriage. And 
yet the Commonwealth act does effectively intend to cover the field, 
which is premised on the determination that every marriage in Aus-
tralia, of all possible kinds, must be defined solely and exhaustively by 
the Commonwealth act. In other words, the Marriage Act operates in 
order to create a federal code in relation to the institution of marriage 
in Australia. Indeed, when the Marriage Act was introduced into Fed-
eral Parliament in 1961, then Attorney General, Sir Garfield Barwick, 
explained that the purpose of the legislation was to “produce a mar-
riage code suitable to present-day Australian needs.”86 That the pur-
pose behind the Marriage Act was to provide uniformity so as to rid 
the legal landscape of the different pieces of state legislation is made 
evident in the following observations of the Attorney General: 
At the present time, the marriage laws of the several States and of the 
Territories to which this bill applies are diverse. The recognition in 
one State of the marriage status acquired in another rests entirely 
upon the rules of private international law worked out over many 
generations to regulate such questions as between independent, and 
in relation to each other, foreign States. The bill would replace this 
diverse body of statutory law and render unnecessary any resort to 
the rules of private international law to determine, in the Common-
wealth or in any Territory, the efficacy and validity of a marriage sol-
emnized or a legitimation effected within the Commonwealth and 
the Territories to which the bill applies, or indeed outside the Com-
monwealth if the marriage is celebrated under Part IV.87 
The bills aiming at legalizing same-sex marriage at the state level 
seek to alter that regime. They seek to provide a definition of marriage 
that is explicitly rejected by the federal legislation. Of course, it is en-
tirely open to the Federal Parliament to introduce legislation which 
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prevents “marriage” from being confused with, or mistaken about, a 
relationship which was not described as such for the purposes of fed-
eral legislation.88 In the words used in the Minister’s second reading 
speech, the Marriage Amending Act was specifically designed to “pro-
vide certainty to all Australians about the meaning of marriage in the 
future.”89 The concern was to curb a perceived judicial activism and 
enable the federal legislature to exclusively define the meaning of mar-
riage in Australia. As Professor Lindell notes, “[w]hatever may have 
been the position before, there can be no doubt that the Marriage Act 
as amended now manifests a clear intention not to recognise same-sex 
marriages as marriages, whether entered into in Australia or in any 
other country.”90 And as he also explains, 
The Commonwealth Parliament used its powers to put the tradi-
tional meaning of “marriage” beyond judicial doubt in its marriage 
legislation and perhaps also to ensure that any civil unions provided 
by State legislation would not be confused with marriage as a national 
legal institution. . . . But if the subject matter is construed broadly 
and generously to accommodate same-sex marriages . . . this will 
ironically make it easier for a national Parliament to ban not only 
same-sex marriages but also civil unions, even if they do bear the label 
of “marriage.”91 
VI. Conclusion 
In conclusion, one can comfortably sustain the following positions 
on the matter: a) the Commonwealth Parliament has the power to pass 
any law dealing with the subject-matter of marriage; b) Common-
wealth law supersedes contradictory state or territory law; c) under the 
Marriage Amendment Act 2004, the Australian states have no power to 
legislate for same-sex marriages; d) if a State or Territory passes a 
same-sex marriage law, such an act would be struck down by the High 
Court as inconsistent with the Commonwealth legislation. 
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In addition, those who support traditional marriage may well con-
tend that same-sex marriage could only be legislated by means of con-
stitutional amendment, and pursuant to section 128—popular referen-
dum. After all, a literal-originalist interpretation of the Australian 
Constitution would indicate that the term “marriage” should have the 
same meaning as it had when the document was enacted, in 1901, a 
position that actually does not contradict the “orthodox rules” of Aus-
tralian legal interpretation, rather quite the contrary. 
